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Abstract
This paper considers whether there were periodically collapsing rational spec-
ulative bubbles in commodity prices over a forty year period from the late 1960s.
We apply a switching regression approach to a broad range of commodities us-
ing two different measures of fundamental values – estimated from convenience
yields and from a set of macroeconomic factors believed to affect commodity de-
mand. We find reliable evidence for bubbles only among crude oil and feeder
cattle, showing the popular belief that the extreme price movements observed in
commodity markets were caused by pure speculation to be unsustainable.
JEL classifications: C12; G13; G14; G23; Q14; Q48
Keywords: Commodity futures; Speculative bubble; Switching regression; Conve-
nience yield; Macroeconomic factors
∗We thank Ogonna Nneji, Jonathan Wallen and participants at the International Conference on
Futures and other Derivative Markets, Shanghai, 2014, for helpful comments. Brooks is at the ICMA
Centre, University of Reading, UK. Prokopczuk is at Leibniz University Hannover, Germany. Cor-
responding author: Yingying Wu, International Business School Suzhou (IBSS) at Xi’an Jiaotong-
Liverpool University, No 111 Ren’ai Rd., Suzhou Dushu Lake Higher Education Town, Suzhou Indus-
trial Park, Jiangsu Province,PR China 215123. e-mail: yingying.wu@xjtlu.edu.cn. Telephone: +86
(0)512 8188 4826.
1 Introduction
The prices of many commodities experienced a spectacular run up during the period
leading into the recent financial crisis. Gold prices, for example, rose by c.500% between
2000 and 2011 before losing a third of their value by 2013. Standard economic theory
suggests that changes in price levels will be governed by the laws of supply and demand,
but it is unclear whether such extreme price swings over protracted periods can be
justified fundamentally, leading to suggestions that they may arise from speculation.
Investors, of course, benefitted from the substantial rises in the prices of commodi-
ties in the early 2000s, and the trading profits made by those who bought early in
the upswing drew in further waves of speculators. Commodities increasingly became
regarded as an investable asset class in their own right, believed to have good diversi-
fication benefits, low correlations with stocks and bonds, and good hedging properties
against inflation – a phenomenon which became known as the ‘financialisation’ of com-
modity markets. As a result, many new commodity index funds were established and
their activities increased trading volumes and altered the balance of transactions be-
tween hedgers and speculators (see, for example, Irwin and Sanders (2012) and Masters
(2008)). Several studies (Gilbert (2010); Tang and Xiong (2012) in particular) have
noted the increases in correlations between the returns on different classes of commodi-
ties. They argue that this is the result of speculative activities rather than fundamental
demand and supply factors that would be more likely to affect individual markets differ-
entially. However, rice futures, for instance, are not included in investable commodity
indices, and apples, which have no futures market, also experienced price surges at the
same time as metals and energy (Irwin et al. (2009); Stoll and Whaley (2010)).
Since commodities are core inputs to the production process or are consumption
goods, the roller coaster-like behavior of their prices has also been argued to have real
consequences. In particular, there have been concerns that price spikes have adversely
affected the social welfare of consumers, especially those in developing countries (see,
e.g., Leyaro (2009)), since households there spend a relatively high proportion of their
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incomes on basic food and energy. Many commentators in the media explicitly laid the
blame for the price rises and increased volatility squarely at the door of speculators,
arguing that investment banks and funds were immoral to engage in strategies that
may have pushed up food prices.1 While newspapers called for commodity speculation
to be banned altogether, in a more measured response, governments and regulatory
bodies have argued for it to be restricted, including a requirement for transparency
in the reporting of speculative trades and the establishment of strict position limits.
In 2006, a US Senate Permanent Subcommittee Staff Report claimed that traditional
supply and demand forces could not fully explain the price increase that began from the
beginning of 2000.2 Later, the United Nations also blamed food price rises on trading
in agricultural commodities rather than the actual food stocks in physical markets,
arguing that “Over $400bn (of paper money) is traded – that’s 20-30 times the physical
production of the commodity”, and calling for tighter regulation of investors to limit
the formation of commodity bubbles.3
While it is undeniable that prices and volatilities rose quickly in a relatively short
period of time during the early years of the new millennium, what is less clear is whether
speculators were the cause or whether such price dynamics were caused by fundamental
factors. The sprawling industrialisation of China and other parts of Southeast Asia and
the consequent thirst of production processes for minerals, a more widespread use of
cars throughout the world, and the switching of agricultural production to biofuels,
have all been argued to have increased the basic demand for commodities, yet their
supply is mostly inelastic in the short run and finite in the long run. This is likely to
have led prices to rise, while increasing uncertainty about how fast demand would grow
may have caused, or at least contributed to, increasing price volatility.
Reaching precisely the opposite conclusion to the studies above concerning the nega-
1In one particularly extreme example, Johann Hadri, writing in a blog for
the Independent newspaper, argues that Goldman ’gambled on starvation’ –
www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/johann-hari/.
2http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT28640/html/CPRT-109SPRT28640.htm
3The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on No.25 Sep. 2012,
accessed from http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/presspb2012d1 en.pdf.
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tive impacts that commodity index traders were argued to have had on commodity price
dynamics, Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin et al. (2010) find no significant change in the correlation between
investable commodity and equity indices as trading activity increased; Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin et al.
(2010) and Stoll and Whaley (2011) argue that commodity investment flows of index
traders did not Granger-cause price fluctuations; and Hamilton (2009) did not dis-
cover an accumulation of inventory linked to prices. Similarly, Sanders et al. (2010)
and Miffre and Brooks (2013) argue that long-short index arbitrageurs were not to
blame either for rising volatility or for increases in correlations between the returns
to commodities and other asset classes. Hence this strand of the literature argues in
favour of the fundamental explanation for price spikes and increasing volatility in the
early 2000s. Banks and hedge funds have, naturally, responded to popular criticism
by arguing that, on the contrary, their activities have actually increased market depth,
improved price discovery and that further regulation would be both unnecessary and
counterproductive.
But would prices have risen and then collapsed anyway, irrespective of the activi-
ties of commodity index traders? While it is not possible to answer this counterfactual
question with certainty, given the profound influence that policy interventions could ex-
ert, scholars have recently attempted to investigate the possible existence of speculative
bubbles in commodity markets. It is clear that a formal evaluation of the possibility
of bubbles in such series is warranted and yet there have been surprisingly few studies
(discussed in detail below) that have done this. A speculative bubble is argued to exist
if there are systematic, persistent and increasing deviations of actual prices from their
fundamentally justifiable values.4 Among existing empirical studies, there is no clear
conclusion that can be drawn so far as to whether commodity price series have been
characterised by speculative bubbles or not. As Michael V. Dunn aptly put it in his
2011 opening statement to the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),
4A good early definition of a rational bubble is given by Diba and Grossman (1988): “A rational
bubble reflects a self-confirming belief that an asset’s price depends on a variable (or a combination
of variables) that is intrinsically irrelevant – that is, no part of market fundamentals – or on truly
relevant variables in a way that involves parameters that are not part of market fundamentals.”
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“no one has presented to this agency any reliable economic analysis to support either
the contention that excessive speculation is affecting the markets we regulate or that
position limits will prevent excessive speculation.”
We extend this emergent literature that investigates putative speculative bubbles
in commodity markets in several important ways. First, we employ a much longer run
of data than existing studies – our sample spans over forty years going back to the late
1960s. We would argue that it is not possible to robustly test for speculative bubbles in
series that do not cover more than one price cycle. Second, we employ a much broader
range of commodities than the one or two individual series used in the majority of
existing studies. Such a comparative approach will enable us to much better tackle
the issue of whether commodity markets have become financialised since if this is the
case we might see bubbles in many commodity markets even where their underlying
demand has risen less strongly. Third, and perhaps most importantly, unlike equity and
real estate markets where the appropriate type of cashflow used to construct the fun-
damental measure is clear (dividends and rental income respectively), for commodities
it is not immediately obvious how we should analogously construct the fundamental
price.5 Existing studies have employed convenience yield in this vein, but this series
may itself be contaminated with a bubble since its estimation is based on the actual
price. Therefore, we follow a second approach and obtain the fundamental value by
exploiting the relationship of commodity prices with a set of macroeconomic factors
that are widely believed to capture commodity demand. Finally, we employ a direct
test for bubble presence based on a regime-switching specification, which, by actually
specifying a model for the dynamics of the bubble and the underlying price series, pro-
vides more diagnostic information than the indirect technique based on recursive unit
root tests employed in most extant research in the commodities arena.
Over the broad range of commodities we examine using the two measures of fun-
5In essence, the approach in the literature is to define fundamentals and then presume that any
deviation from this represents speculation. As such, if the fundamentals are mis-specified, action from
the actual prices will appear in the residuals and be mis-classified as speculation. As we demonstrate
below, since our key finding is that there is little evidence for speculative bubbles, we need not be
concerned about our results being driven by this issue.
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damental values, we find similar results in that only two commodities – feeder cattle
and crude oil – are characterized by periodically collapsing speculative bubbles. Im-
portantly, we can also infer that, for other markets not exhibiting evidence in favour of
speculative bubbles, the high volatilities and price spikes must be attributed to other
factors – for example, surging demand or supply interruptions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the very
limited extant evidence on the existence of bubbles in commodities. This section also
explores the methods we use for deriving bubble fundamentals. Section 3 then out-
lines the empirical approach we adopt for bubble testing. Section 4 describes the data
and variable construction while Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6
concludes.
2 Existing Evidence on Bubbles in Commodity Mar-
kets
Existing bubble tests can be classified into indirect and direct forms. The latter were
proposed to exploit the theoretical characteristics of bubble processes in order to specify
the dynamics of the bubble’s development and the consequent implications for the
movements of prices. To detect periodically collapsing bubbles, regime switching tests
have been constructed by van Norden and Schaller (1993) where the probability of the
bubble surviving is a function of its size, an approach used in numerous studies of
bubbles in equity markets.
Compared to the large number of studies on stocks (and real estate), fewer inves-
tigations have been carried out in the context of commodities. However, the volatility
of commodity prices has driven recent interest and a substantial amount of literature
is now emerging, although the results thus far are still inconclusive. From a theoretical
perspective, Hamilton (2009) shows how the price rises in 2007–08 arose as a result
of growing world demand at times of limited supply growth, whereas previous price
5
spikes had arisen predominantly from supply interruptions. These market conditions,
combined with extremely low price elasticity of demand caused bubble-like price growth
and then collapse when more standard levels of demand and supply resumed. Single-
ton (2014) develops a model where ‘information frictions’ combined with speculative
activity leads to price inflation and subsequent collapse. The unwinding of similar posi-
tions by large institutions concurrently can cause bubble collapses, especially in illiquid
markets Brunnermeier (2009).
One strand of the literature attributes the observed price spikes to fundamental
variation mainly driven by local commodity activity – see, for example, Sanders and
Irwin (2010), who did not find a uniform influence of new demand from index funds
across different markets after applying a cross-sectional test. On the other hand, Robles
et al. (2009) demonstrate the influential role of speculative activities. Using a widely
employed bubble testing tool – the Johansen test – Liu and Tang (2010) find evidence
of cointegration between prices and fundamentals for four commodity markets before
2004 but not after that, implying that the rise in commodity prices occurring during
the mid- to late-2000s is mainly due to a rise in speculative activities, i.e. a bubble.
De Meo (2013) conducts various indirect bubble tests, including a variance bounds
approach and a test on restrictions in a vector autoregressive model for crude oil and
three non-ferrous metal commodity markets. It is argued, following a rolling window
analysis, that commodity-specific factors rather than index investment trigger regime
shifts. Similarly, Bialkowski et al. (2011) do not find supportive evidence for a specu-
lative bubble in the gold market when applying a Markov regime-switching augmented
Dickey–Fuller test to the residual of the gold price regressed on convenience yield.
Other related bubble testing studies employing the Phillips and Yu (2011) recursive
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test include Figuerola-Ferretti et al. (2012), who find mixed
results from five metal and energy markets, Gutierrez (2013), who is able to identify
collapsing bubbles for wheat, corn and rough rice but not for the soybean market and
Etienne et al. (2013), who argue that the 12 agricultural markets they examine exhibit
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price explosiveness. Finally, Emekter et al. (2012) adopt a duration dependence test
and some evidence for speculative bubbles is observed in 11 of 28 commodity markets
under consideration.
More closely related to our study, a handful of papers testing for speculative bubbles
in commodities use direct approaches. Among these, Liu et al. (2013) apply the regime-
switching regression model of van Norden and Schaller (1993) to wheat futures but the
estimation results do not entirely accord with a periodically surviving and collapsing
pattern. They note, however, that it may be that the convenience yield provides a poor
representation of the fundamental value (most notably its lower explanatory power after
2004 – see also Liu and Tang (2010)). As we discuss in more detail below, empirical
tests for a bubble are actually joint tests of the no bubble hypothesis and of having the
correct model for the fundamental value.
Shi and Arora (2012) compare various three-regime switching models for the crude
oil market and find supportive evidence for the widely claimed recent bubble in oil
prices. Bertus and Stanhouse (2001) apply dynamic factor analysis to the gold market
using the Kalman filter; no significant evidence for bubbles is found at conventional
levels. Lammerding et al. (2013) treat the bubble component as state variable and
find significant evidence for the existence of speculative bubbles in the oil market.
Altogether, we might conclude that the existing evidence on speculative bubbles in
commodity markets is sparse, limited in scope and yielding mixed results.
2.1 Fundamental Values for Commodities
We mentioned above that tests for speculative bubbles depend critically on the con-
struction of appropriate fundamental values. As noted by Flood and Garber (1980),
any omitted variable or measurement errors in the fundamentals can bias the bubble
test in favour of rejection of the no-bubble null hypothesis. In the context of equities,
dividends are the obvious choice of fundamental measure since they represent the ulti-
mate cashflow received by investors; this role can similarly be fulfilled by rents in real
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estate applications. However, in the context of commodities, it is not entirely clear upon
what basis fundamentals should be constructed since there exists no direct analogy to
dividends and rents as commodity holders do not receive periodic monetary cashflows.
Evidently, commodities have a final demand for use in production or consumption, and
the implicit value from holding the spot commodity is captured by the convenience
yield.6 Thus fundamental prices may be constructed from convenience yields, which
then take the place of dividends in a discounted cashflow framework.
Alternatively, a proxy for the fundamental value may be obtained by relating the ac-
tual price of the commodity to a basket of variables that are thought to affect the forces
of demand and/or supply. Accounting for plausible explanations of 2008 price peaks
in commodities, namely easy monetary policy and strong economic growth, Frankel
and Rose (2010) argue that commodity prices have both macroeconomic and microeco-
nomic determinants. In their empirical testing results, all explanatory variables – both
macroeconomic (the real interest rate, global GDP and the inflation rate) and microe-
conomic (inventories, the basis, and a measure of uncertainty) – variables show some
effects on real commodity prices, although microeconomic factors have stronger and
more consistent impacts. Similarly, in a study of the excess-comovement of commod-
ity prices, Ai et al. (2006) demonstrate the high predictive power of macro-indicators
and commodity-specific variables in explaining the price behavior of five agricultural
commodities.7
In the existing literature that tests for bubbles in commodities, the majority of
studies (Liu and Tang (2010), De Meo (2013), Liu et al. (2013), Shi and Arora (2012),
etc.) employ the present value model illustrated by Pindyck (1993) following Campbell
and Shiller (1987) in using the marginal convenience yield. Pindyck argues that changes
6Brennan (1958) defines convenience yield as the benefit from holding the underlying to the physical
holder as it can smooth production shortages and meet unexpected demand from the product market.
7In our study, we employ US-based macroeconomic series despite the fact that commodity markets
are global. We believe that this apparent mis-match is not consequential since Geman and Ohana
(2009) show that for the case of crude oil, it does not matter whether US or global inventories are
used as the world economy is highly correlated with that of the US. In addition, using US based data
circumvents numerous potential aggregation issues relating to differences in currencies and units of
measurement.
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in the demand for and supply of commodities cause changes in current and expected
convenience yields and thus the present value model is considered a parsimonious form
of a dynamic equilibrium model. The empirical evidence from four commodities show
different levels of conformity with the model. For heating oil, with the lowest level
of serial correlation, the model fits the best. On the other hand, the model does
not provide a good characterization for gold, where high serial correlation is found in
excess returns. The mixed results may indicate the limits of the model set up or provide
evidence that the prices of some commodities may be driven by ‘fads’ or other non-
fundamental factors. It is also possible that the strong conformity in the case of heating
oil together with low serial correlation in its excess returns may be caused by the high
levels of convenience yield for that series, which makes speculation more costly.8
3 Economic Modeling and Empirical Investigation
3.1 Rational Asset Pricing
The present value model depicts the fundamental value of an asset as the sum of
the current and the discounted future cashflows from its ownership. Under rational
expectations and assuming a constant discount rate, a risk-neutral investor requires
that the risky asset price is given by:
Pt = (1 + r)
−1Et(Pt+1 + Yt) (1)
where Pt is the actual price of the asset at time t, r is the discount rate, Yt is the
endowment received (e.g., dividends for stocks and convenience yields for commodities),
and Et denotes the expectation conditional on information at time t. In a multi-period
8A further approach to measuring fundamentals is due to Bertus and Stanhouse (2001), who build
an equilibrium model where market participants’ utilities are maximized; however, their approach is
less than intuitive and has consequently not been the subject of any additional applications.
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framework, looking T periods forward we obtain:
Pt =
T∑
k=0
(1 + r)−(k+1)Et(Yt+k) + (1 + r)
−TEt(Pt+T ) (2)
The second term on the right-hand side converges to zero at an infinite horizon when the
transversality condition is met, and thus if the expected growth rate of the asset price
does not surpass r, then Equation (2) collapses to the familiar ‘discounted dividend’
model in the context of an application to stocks:9
Pt =
∞∑
k=0
(1 + r)−(k+1)Et(Yt+k) (3)
If the transversality condition fails, apart from the result in (3), an alternative solution
to (1) is where Pt contains a bubble. In such circumstances, the price constructed
from (3) is the fundamental price, P ∗t , rather than the actual price, Pt. The bubble
component, Bt, systematically drives the market price away from this fundamental
price:
Pt = P
∗
t +Bt (4)
The bubble term can follow different evolutionary processes depending on the forces
driving it. Nevertheless, even when the asset price contains a bubble, Equation (1)
should still hold so that there are no arbitrage opportunities. Hence the bubble must
follow:
Et(Bt+1) = (1 + r)Bt (5)
Thus the bubble is expected to grow at the required rate of return and hence the con-
tinuing existence of the bubble is rational. Investors hold the asset with the expectation
of a capital gain even when market prices are already above fundamental values since it
is only possible to predict probabilistically when the bubble will collapse – see O’Hara
(2008).
9In fact, Equation (3) will also apply when Yt is based on other types of cashflows, such as rents or
those arising implicitly from the convenience yield.
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3.2 Commodity Fundamental Value
As discussed above, there is no consensus on commodity fundamental valuation, and
hence we achieve this by separately employing two methods at the first step of the
empirical investigation and we compare the resulting bubble models.
Method 1 : Although the benefit to the physical holders of commodities (the con-
venience yield) does not come in the form of a cashflow as for other assets such as
equities in terms of the dividend, the basic present value model should apply equally to
commodities as it does to any asset which yields actual payoffs, as argued by Pindyck
(1993). This provides the foundation for our first approach to fundamental valuation.
The accrued convenience yield from holding storable commodities can provide a highly
reduced model of commodity markets, where changes in demand from and supply to the
market are integrated into changes in current and expected future convenience yields.
Similar to the approach by van Norden and Schaller (1993) in the context of stocks
paying dividends and by Liu and Tang (2010) on the commodity price with convenience
yields, we regress observed futures prices on net convenience yields, and the residuals,
εˆ1,t, are taken as deviations from fundamental values:
10
Pt = λ1,0 + λ1,1δt + ε1,t (6)
where δt stands for the net convenience yield at time t. It is worth mentioning that
we test for bubbles in real terms, and thus all nominal futures price series are deflated
with a general price index.
Unfortunately, the series of convenience yields in Equation (6) is not observable, and
we thus need to extract it from futures market data. In the framework of the theory of
storage, the price of the futures contract Ft,T maturing at T and observed at t can be
10It is common in the literature e.g., in Fama and French (1987), that the spot price of commodities
is proxied by the most nearby futures contract, not only due to the higher liquidity in the futures
market than the relatively rarely traded spot market, but also because the use of the futures contract
for the spot price ensures that the same underlying is adopted for both spot and futures prices.
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linked with the spot price (Pt) as follows:
Ft,T = Pt
(
1 + (rft − δt)
(
T − t
252
))
(7)
with rft denoting the annual risk-free rate from time t to T .
11 For simplicity, both
risk-free rate and convenience yield are assumed constant over the period from t to T .
Rearranging Equation (7), annualized net convenience yield observations can effectively
be extracted as:
δt = r
f
t +
(
1−
Ft,T
Pt
)
252
T − t
(8)
It is important to note, however, that such an application of the present value model
faces several issues regarding the use of convenience yields. First, the convenience yield
is latent. For commodities traded in the futures market, only the convenience yield net
of the storage costs can be estimated, within which the variation in storage cost cannot
be stripped away. Second, the maturity of the convenience yield may vary over time.
Not all commodities have futures contracts traded at regular intervals, and thus the
maturities of the convenience yields from the two most nearby futures contracts are not
necessarily consistent at different points in time. Third, the convenience yield could be
contaminated with a bubble since it is estimated based on the actual spot price itself.
This makes it difficult to disentangle the fundamental and bubbly parts of the price
series based on convenience yields. Thus, we employ a second approach for estimating
the fundamental value.
Method 2 : Given the limitations of convenience yields as a fundamental measure,
for comparison we make use of economic factors which have been empirically validated
as influencing the demand for and/or the supply of commodities. A similar approach
can be found in tests for bubbles in other asset classes but we are the first to use
it in the context of commodities. For example, Roche (2001) investigates the rise in
house prices in Dublin, where fundamental values are based on the inverted demand
11Note that the convenience yield extracted here is the net value with regard to storage, handling
and insurance costs, etc.
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function of expected disposable incomes, expected real mortgage rates and so on. In
Method 2, we therefore regress commodity prices against a set of economic variables.
The residuals, εˆ2,t, from the estimation are taken as the bubble term Bt.
A well-known characteristic of some commodities, especially those in the grain,
animal and energy classes, is the seasonality in their price series due to harvest and/or
consumer behavior patterns – see, e.g., Fama and French (1987).12 Most fundamental
economic series used in our study are obtained after seasonal adjustment and we also
include seasonal dummy variables in the regression equation as:
Pt =
12∑
j=1
γ2,jDt,j +
4∑
i=1
λ2,iXt,i + ε2,t (9)
where Dt,j are monthly dummy variables employed to capture the seasonality. With
the guidance of Frankel and Rose (2010), the factors included in Xt,i of the regression
model for the fundamental values are: (1) industrial production, which measures how
the general level of the economy affects the demand for commodity markets that include
many raw materials playing a vital role in production processes; (2) housing starts,
which serves as complementary proxy for general economic activity and is believed to
be a leading economic indicator; (3) real personal consumption expenditure, which takes
into account the demand variation from consumer purchasing power and is especially
relevant for the agricultural and soft sectors; (4) three-month treasury bill yields, which
captures monetary policy effects on commodity markets.13
12For the convenience yield regressions (Equation (6)), the seasonal dummy variables are not neces-
sary since the independent variables (the convenience yields) also themselves show seasonality – see,
e.g., Brooks et al. (2013), and so these could account for the seasonality in the dependent variable
(commodity prices) if it exists.
13Due to data availability, we have to drop two of the variables used by Frankel and Rose (2010) in
the main part of this study to maximise the number of observations available: the US dollar index,
which affects the overseas demand for commodities and also inventory levels, which play a role in the
supply of commodities. The available inventory data also have several issues – see e.g. Gorton et al.
(2013) regarding the different data sources across commodities, lag of announcements, short history
available, etc. Compared to their demand, the supply of commodities is more inelastic, and thus we
focus on factors that affect the demand function in determining our fundamental values.
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3.3 Speculative Bubbles and Estimation
The two-regime switching regression model introduced by van Norden and Schaller
(1993) (vNS hereafter) is employed as the main tool of analysis. In the two-regime
model, the bubble (Bt) evolves between a surviving regime (S) and a collapsing regime
(C).14 Although there exists an extended three-regime switching regression (see Brooks
and Katsaris (2005)) where the model is augmented to include a third (dormant) regime
in which the bubble grows at the fundamental rate of return in addition to the collaps-
ing and surviving regimes, we adopt the statistically more parsimonious and stable
two-regime model mainly due to the limited number of observations available for com-
modities compared with equities.
Based on the earlier model of Blanchard and Watson (1983), the approach by vNS
adopts a more general specification that overcomes important limitations of the previous
generation of rational bubble specifications. First, the collapsing probability is not
constant but a function of the relative (to the actual price) bubble size. Second, the
expected value of the bubble conditional on collapse is non-zero, allowing for partial
collapsing, which falls in line with some common features of historical crash periods.
In detail, considering that the probability of a crash increases with the speculative
component in the price, vNS assume q, the probability of survival, to be a decreasing
function of the relative size of the speculative component (bt):
q ≡ q(bt) (10)
dq(bt)
d|bt|
< 0 (11)
where bt ≡ Bt/Pt, the relative size of the bubble, is the ratio of the bubble size (Bt) to
the actual commodity spot price (Pt), and |bt| is the absolute value of bt, implying that
the bubble can be either positive or negative in this model.
14As Schaller and van Norden (2002) point out, the switching-regression model here has one state
independent probability, which is a special case of a Markov-switching model since today’s state is
independent of yesterday’s.
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To account for the fact that the bubble term may not collapse in one single period,
i.e. partial collapsing, they specify the expected value of Bt+1 conditional on collapse
to be a function u of bt:
E(Bt+1|C) = u(bt)Pt with probability q(bt) (12)
where u(.) is a continuous and everywhere differentiable function such that u(0) = 0
and 0 ≤ du(bt)
dbt
. This condition ensures that the bubble is expected to shrink in the
collapsing state. Combining Equations (12), (10) and (5), we have the expected value
of the bubble term conditional on being in the surviving state:
E(Bt+1|S) =
1 + rt
q(bt)
Bt −
1− q(bt)
q(bt)
u(bt)Pt with probability 1− q(bt) (13)
It is worthwhile pointing out that the restrictions on u(bt) and q(bt) are not imposed
on the data but rather are designed to test whether speculative bubbles are a possible
explanation for the dynamic behavior of prices. We can convert the above equations
into switching regressions for expected excess returns in each regime as a function of
the bubble size:
Et(Rt+1|S) =
1− q(bt)
q(bt)
[(1 + rt)bt − ut(bt)] (14)
Et(Rt+1|C) = u(bt)− (1 + rt)bt
where Et(Rt+1|S), (Et(Rt+1|C)), denote the expected excess return from time t to t+1
conditional on survival (respectively, collapse), dependent on all information available
at the end of period t.
After taking the first-order Taylor expansion of Equation (14) around an arbitrary
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value b0, we have the linearized equations:
Et(Rt+1|S) = βS0 + βS1bt (15)
Et(Rt+1|C) = βC0 + βC1bt
with
βS1 ≡
(
−
1
q(b0)2
dq(b0)
dbt
[(1 + rt)b0 − u(b0)] +
1− q(b0)
q(b0)
[
1 + rt −
du(b0)
dbt
])
βC1 ≡
[
du(b0)
dbt
− (1 + rt)
]
Given that rt > 0, 0 ≤
du(bt)
dbt
≤ 1 and dq(bt)
d|bt|
< 0, it is easy to show that βS1 ≥
0 and βC1 ≤ 0, or more generally, βC1 < βS1. This implies that in the surviving regime,
the expected return is positively related to the size of the bubble and in the collapsing
regime the expected return and bubble size are negatively correlated. Moreover, to
ensure that the probability q(t) is within the range between 0 and 1, following vNS,
we adopt a probit functional form for the probability of the bubble surviving in period
t+ 1:
qt+1 = Φ(βq0 + βq1|bt|) (16)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function. As we assume dq(bt)
d|bt|
< 0,
if βq1 < 0, the probability of staying in the surviving regime is a decreasing function of
the bubble size.
By substituting the realized values for the expected returns in Equation (15) and
adding an error term, together with Equation (16), the switching-regression equation
can be written as:
Rt+1|S = βS0 + βS1bt + ǫt+1|S
Rt+1|C = βC0 + βC1bt + ǫt+1|C (17)
qt+1 = Φ(βq0 + βq1|bt|)
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where ǫt+1|i ∼ N(0, σi), (i = S, C) and σS , σC denote the standard deviations of the
unexpected excess returns (ǫt+1|S, ǫt+1|C) in the two regimes. Thus, the switching-
regression model can be estimated by maximising the log-likelihood function (LL):
LL =
N∑
t=1
ln{qt+1ϕ
(
Rt+1|S − βS0 − βS1bt
σS
)
σ−1S
+(1− qt+1)ϕ
(
Rt+1|C − βC0 − βC1bt
σC
)
σ−1C } (18)
where ϕ is the standard normal density function. The parameters of the regressions
and the optimal regime for each observation do not need to be assumed beforehand but
are estimated together with the probability of being in regime i = S, C at time t + 1
dependent on the size of bt as shown in Equation (16).
Summarizing, to test whether the speculative bubble can explain the observed be-
havior of commodity prices, Equations (17) are estimated and the following constraints
on the parameters must hold:15 (i) βC0 6= βS0 implies that the mean returns are differ-
ent between the two regimes; (ii) βC1 ≤ 0 ensures that the expected return is a negative
function of the bubble in the collapsing regime; (iii) βC1 < βS1 implies that the bubble
yield is higher in the surviving regime than in the collapsing regime when the bubble
is positive; (iv) βq1 < 0 must hold for the probability of surviving to decrease with
increasing bubble size. If these constraints are met and the variation in futures returns
can be captured by the model, then it gives credibility to arguments in favor of the
existence of periodically collapsing bubbles.
4 Data Sources and Variable Construction
4.1 Commodity Futures and Excess Returns
In total, we consider 18 commodities in our study which can be categorized into five
subgroups, namely: grains, softs, animals and woods, precious metals, and energy.
15Likelihood ratio tests are employed to test these restrictions in the empirical analysis.
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Futures prices are sampled on the first working day of each month from February 1967
to December 2011, although for some commodities, e.g. coffee and feeder cattle, the
sampling dates are different due to data availability. The details of the sample period
for each series together with information regarding commodity names and exchanges
are listed in Panel A of Table 1. This period of over forty years spans several market
booms and falls, importantly covering the two episodes that peaked in 1974 and 2008,
the commodities depression in the 1990s, and also the credit crunch and sovereign debt
crisis in the 2000s. Although commodity futures prices are available on a daily basis,
we use monthly data mainly because we want to disentangle the bubbly aspects of
behavior from the variations caused by microstructure mechanisms in the market that
affect higher frequency data. More importantly, most of the influential factors that
we wish to incorporate into the fundamental model (e.g., macroeconomic factors) are
available on a monthly basis only.
Commodity futures prices are obtained from the database maintained by the Com-
modity Research Bureau (CRB). In Table 1, Panel B presents summary statistics of
the most nearby commodity futures price series in real terms. Although the units differ
across commodities, comparing the standard deviations to the mean values of the most
nearby futures prices, we find that some commodities such as coffee, cocoa and silver
are more volatile while feeder cattle and lumber are much less so.
The annualized monthly total excess logarithmic return, Rt, for each individual
commodity (the dependent variable of Equation (17)), is computed by rolling the long
position in the most nearby futures contract Ft,T (as a proxy for the spot price, Pt) at
time t− 1 and t:
Rt = (lnFt,T − lnFt−1,T )
252
n
+ δt − r
f
t (19)
where n denotes the number of business days between t− 1 and t. Taking into account
that the most nearby futures may roll over across two different contracts between time
t− 1 and t, we compose the monthly return of two parts if the contract changes during
that period. So if the most nearby contract is rolled over from Ft∗,T1 to Ft∗,T2 at time
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t∗ (t− 1 ≤ t∗ ≤ t), the annualized monthly return Rt can be written:
Rt = [(lnFt∗,T1 − lnFt−1,T1) + (lnFt,T2 − lnFt∗,T2)]
252
n
+ δt − r
f
t (20)
Summary statistics of the individual total excess returns are presented in Panel C of
Table 1. 13 of 18 commodities have negative average monthly returns in real terms
from holding the most nearby futures contracts, which implies contango is typical for
these commodities. We can infer that the remaining commodities generally show back-
wardation over the sample period. In particular, the result for crude oil is in line with
the backwardation observed in previous studies – see, for example Litzenberger and
Rabinowitz (1995). Energy commodities are the most highly volatile and feeder cattle
the least. The natural gas returns series in particular has double the monthly standard
deviation compared with most of the other series. All returns series except four are
positively skewed and have a coefficient of kurtosis greater than three. These findings
confirm the well known characteristics of commodities returns compared with equity
returns, which are also leptokurtic but negatively skewed.
4.2 Macroeconomic Factors
The following aggregate variables are used for the regression-based fundamental valua-
tions on a monthly basis and are obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Database
(FRED) of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis:
Industrial Production (Final Products) (seasonally adjusted) – gauges real output
for all facilities located in the US (excluding those in US territories).
Housing Starts (Total: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started) (seasonally
adjusted) – captures the number of privately owned new houses on which construction
has been started in a given period.
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures (seasonally adjusted) – reflects the actual
and imputed expenditures of households and is a measure of the value of goods and
services consumed by individuals.
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3-Month Treasury Bill Yield (Secondary Market Rate) – is the discount yield of 3M
T-Bills in the secondary market.
To deflate the commodity price series we also obtain the Consumer Price Index
for All Urban Consumers (seasonally adjusted), which is representative of the buying
habits of approximately 80 percent of the non-institutional population of the US.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Bubble Measures
From Equations (6) and (9), we have the deviations from fundamentals, εˆt, which
we treat as the bubble, Bt. It is important to note at this stage that strictly, these
deviations from fundamentals may or may not be accurately described as bubbles;
indeed, as we show below, most commodity series show little support for bubbles.
However, we continue to use the term ‘bubble’ in place of ‘non-fundamental’ in the
discussion below following the literature and for brevity. Descriptive statistics of the
relative fundamental deviations are presented in Table 2. The maximum, minimum,
average, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of bt based on convenience yields
are shown in Panel A, while those based on macroeconomic variables are displayed in
Panel B. We observe that the deviations from fundamentals can be either positive or
negative, although on average they are below zero for both methods of constructing
fundamentals, corresponding with the long bear market that persisted in commodities
throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s. Most of the bubble series have negative
skewness except feeder cattle and platinum under the convenience yield approach, and
soybean meal and gold under the macroeconomic fundamental model. In general, the
convenience yield-based bubbles are more volatile and more skewed than those based
on macroeconomic variables, although the former are almost invariably with thinner
tails than the latter.
The fundamental values, P ∗t , of a subset of commodities are displayed in Figure 1
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together with real commodity spot prices, Pt.
16 One can observe that grain and soft
commodities generally show positive price spikes around 1974, and relatively smaller
ones from 2007, while precious metals and energy commodities only show discernable
bubbles in the late 2000s. By visually comparing the bubbles using the two approaches
to measuring fundamentals, we find that in general they follow similar, yet somewhat
different, profiles over time.
5.2 Switching-regression Results
Table 3 provides the estimated coefficients of the two-regime switching regression using
the bubble obtained based on the convenience yield constructed using the methods
outlined in Subsection 3.2 above. We can observe that for almost all commodities
the coefficients do not meet the requirements implied for the presence of periodically
bursting bubbles to be plausible. There are only two exceptions to this among the 18
commodities considered: feeder cattle shows strong evidence for a bubble and crude
oil exhibits some evidence. Specifically, for feeder cattle, βC1 and βq1 are significantly
negative with 95% confidence, implying that both the return of the next period and
the probability of staying in the survival regime are decreasing functions of the bubble
component as required. Also, the return is expected to be higher in response to bubble
growth in the surviving regime as implied by the significant positive βS1. The mean
returns differ between the two regimes, with βS0 > βC0, which intuitively implies higher
expected returns in the surviving regime than in the collapsing regime. The average
annualized excess returns are 14% and−10% respectively in the surviving and collapsing
regimes. The volatility of the error term in the surviving regime (σS) is at a lower level
than in the collapsing regime (σC) with very high confidence. Moreover, the likelihood
ratio tests of these restrictions presented in Table 4 lend some support to the notion
of bubble existence in the feeder cattle market. First, three statistics are significant
with at least 95% confidence and the fourth p-value of the likelihood statistic is 0.13.
16Due to space constraints, only a subsample of commodities from each sector are displayed as
exemplars.
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The average ex ante probability of being in the surviving regime at time t, defined by
Φ(βq0), is 64.43%, but it is not significant at conventional levels.
For crude oil, all four coefficients constraints are broadly met, and more than half
model estimates as well as the likelihood ratio tests are significant at conventional levels.
We also infer the ex ante probability of being in the surviving regime, Φ(2.04), to be
97.93%. This result corroborates the findings of Shi and Arora (2012) and Lammerding
et al. (2013) regarding this market.
Table 5 presents the model estimation results from the bubble derived based on
macroeconomic variables. Although in general more commodities – e.g. corn, soybean
oil, cocoa and gold – show either a significant negative βC1 or βq1 (or both), none of
the other coefficient constraints can be met. For example, the mean excess return for
soybean oil is lower in the surviving regime (-13%) than in the collapsing regime (52%),
which is counterintuitive. Considering the coefficient estimates and the restrictions for
valid bubble processes collectively, in addition to the two commodities feeder cattle and
crude oil, wheat also demonstrates some evidence of periodically collapsing speculative
bubbles. All the coefficient estimates in Table 5 together with the first three likelihood
ratio tests in Table 6 are highly significant and of plausible magnitudes. However,
the average ex ante probability of being in the surviving regime is implausibly low:
Φ(−1.04) = 14.9%.
Thus, integrating the results from Tables 3 and 5 with the likelihood ratio test
results in Tables 4 and 6, we can draw the conclusion that among all 18 commodities
investigated, only feeder cattle and crude oil exhibit signs for periodically collapsing
speculative bubbles. In all other markets, no convincing evidence for the existence of
bubbles is found. This is our main result.
It is also of interest to investigate how well the estimated ex ante probabilities
of the bubble collapsing (defined as one minus the probability of surviving) can cap-
ture real commodity price variations over time. Figures 2 and 3 plot these ex ante
probabilities of collapsing based on the estimate results from using convenience yields
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and macroeconomic variables together with the spot prices for these two commodities
(feeder cattle and crude oil respectively). Visually we observe that the probability of
collapsing based on macroeconomic variables can capture the price drops more closely.
For example, for feeder cattle there are several dates with the probability of collapsing
above 50% – around 1975, 1979, 1986 and 1996 – and all but the third of these dates are
accompanied by clear price dives. The probability of collapsing for crude oil overall is
lower than that for feeder cattle. Compared with the highest value of 99.07% in March
1975 for feeder cattle, the highest probability is 37.16% in March 2009 for the crude oil
market. However, the spikes in probability also coincide with significant price falls and
the figure gives further credence to the generally agreed crude oil crash in late 2008 –
see, e.g. Singleton (2014) and Phillips and Yu (2011). We should note, however, that
while the macro-based fundamentals give a more accurate profile to the probabilities of
collapse, the rises in the likelihoods of the bubble bursting occur at the same time as,
or even slightly after, the actual price drops. This would evidently limit the usefulness
of the model for market participants.
5.3 Robustness Checks and Additional Analysis
We conducted several robustness checks. First, we added inventory information as a
determinant of supply dynamics in the fundamental valuation to the analysis. Our core
results remained unchanged. Second, we augment the switching regime probability and
the expected return with hedging pressure information. Again, our findings do not
change. These analyses are not presented due to space constraints, but available on
request.
6 Conclusions
In this study, we have tested a broad range of commodities for switching speculative
behavior with over forty years of data from February 1967 to December 2011. In
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contrast with the existing literature in this area, we adopt two different methods to
measure fundamental values. One draws on the present value model and employs
convenience yields, while the other relies on macroeconomic variables that are generally
agreed to affect commodity fundamental values. Despite the considerable differences
in the theoretical foundations and data used for the two methods, we obtain similar
and robust results that only two of the 18 commodities investigated (feeder cattle and
crude oil) provide convincing evidence of periodically collapsing bubbles. The use of
additional variables in the fundamental model and in the bubble specification do not
alter our core results.
Our findings add to a growing body of evidence running counter to the broadly held
popular belief that commodity index traders and other speculators caused the inception
of widespread speculative bubbles that formed and collapsed over the past decade. We
thus attribute the considerable price rises and subsequent falls that occurred over this
period to fundamental factors that changed either current or future expected demand for
commodities in production processes or as consumption goods and to temporary supply
shocks. Therefore, from the perspective of speculative bubbles at least, additional
regulation of the activities of investors is probably unnecessary and as Sanders and
Irwin (2011) and Miffre and Brooks (2013) note, it could have adverse consequences for
liquidity and market depth, and worse, may force speculators into the cash markets.
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Figure 1: Deviations From Fundamentals and the Real Price
In these plots, Real price refers to the deflated most nearby futures price, and Fundamental Value (P ∗
t
1) is computed based on convenience yields and (P ∗
t
2) is based on
macroeconomic variables. All the time series are employed on a monthly basis.
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Figure 2: Probability of Collapse versus the Spot Price of Feeder Cattle and Crude Oil
In these plots, Real spot price refers to the deflated most nearby futures price, and the Probability of collapse is the ex ante probability based on the convenience yield
approach.
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Figure 3: Probability of Collapse versus the Spot Price of Feeder Cattle and Crude Oil
In these plots, Real spot price refers to the deflated most nearby futures price, and the Probability of collapse is the ex ante probability based on fundamentals estimated
using macroeconomic variables.
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Table 1: Commodity Data
Panel A of the table lists the exchanges where commodities are traded, the start dates, end dates and number of observations for each commodity used in this study.
Panels B and C present descriptive statistics of the most nearby futures prices and excess returns, in real terms, respectively.
Panel A: Commodity Contracts Panel B: Most Nearby Futures Prices Panel C: Excess Returns
Sector Commodity Exchange Start date End date Obs. Mean S.D. Skew. Kurt. Mean S.D. Skew. Kurt.
Grains
Oats CBT 2/1/1967 12/30/2011 539 268.40 105.34 0.71 3.07 -0.07 1.15 0.72 6.27
Wheat CBT 2/1/1967 12/30/2011 545 605.73 280.35 1.84 7.97 -0.12 0.97 0.34 4.79
Corn CBT 2/1/1967 12/30/2011 539 453.66 202.04 1.08 4.14 -0.14 0.94 1.07 11.31
Soybeans CBT 2/1/1967 12/30/2011 539 1094.56 499.18 1.80 8.50 -0.01 0.99 0.74 8.30
Soybean oil CBT 2/1/1967 12/30/2011 539 39.74 19.22 2.08 9.73 0.04 1.16 0.96 6.69
Soybean meal CBT 2/1/1967 12/30/2011 539 312.41 138.56 2.87 18.44 0.06 1.18 0.60 7.92
Soft
Orange juice ICE 2/1/1967 12/30/2011 539 172.17 66.48 0.38 2.31 -0.01 1.17 1.15 8.58
Cotton ICE 2/1/1967 12/30/2011 539 107.76 48.27 1.09 4.87 -0.09 0.99 0.13 4.58
Coffee ICE 11/3/1975 12/30/2011 434 195.00 132.52 1.90 7.73 -0.02 1.36 0.30 4.36
Cocoa ICE 2/1/1967 12/30/2011 539 3015.13 2141.63 2.06 7.53 -0.04 1.14 0.42 3.83
Wood&Animal
Feeder cattle CME 1/3/1972 10/28/2010 466 113.31 29.40 1.55 5.49 0.03 0.65 -0.47 6.08
Lumber CME 10/1/1969 11/15/2010 494 349.77 108.76 0.64 2.80 -0.24 1.27 0.11 4.10
Precious metal
Silver Comex 2/1/1967 12/30/2011 539 1129.32 833.64 3.57 22.43 -0.07 1.18 -1.63 21.69
Gold Comex 1/2/1975 12/30/2011 444 589.18 260.77 1.57 5.35 -0.05 0.66 -0.03 6.52
Platinum NYMEX 11/2/1970 12/30/2011 494 737.72 335.29 1.46 4.76 -0.01 1.08 0.28 13.12
Energy
Crude oil NYMEX 4/4/1983 12/30/2011 345 39.97 21.22 1.30 4.26 0.07 1.33 -0.51 4.91
Heating oil NYMEX 12/1/1978 12/30/2011 397 1.19 0.61 0.99 3.45 0.06 1.33 0.71 7.82
Natural gas NYMEX 4/4/1990 12/30/2011 261 4.21 2.30 1.40 5.00 -0.42 2.27 0.11 5.54
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Bubble Terms
This table displays descriptive statistics of the bubble terms. Panel A shows the relative bubble terms bt(1) estimated using convenience yields while
Panel B shows those of bt(2) based on fundamentals estimated using macroeconomic variables. The columns headings Min., Max., S.D., Skew.,
Kurt. stand for minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis, respectively.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of bt(1) Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of bt(2)
Commodity Min. Max. Mean S.D. Skew. Kurt. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Skew. Kurt.
Oats -1.41 0.58 -0.15 0.44 -0.63 2.56 -0.93 0.50 -0.06 0.26 -0.60 3.28
Wheat -1.11 0.69 -0.17 0.43 -0.27 2.17 -0.85 0.58 -0.06 0.27 -0.47 3.04
Corn -1.25 0.66 -0.18 0.45 -0.31 2.00 -0.74 0.56 -0.06 0.25 -0.04 2.37
Soybeans -1.34 0.74 -0.17 0.44 -0.49 2.49 -0.75 0.59 -0.06 0.26 -0.10 2.45
Soybean oil -1.22 0.80 -0.13 0.38 -0.64 3.18 -0.89 0.59 -0.08 0.31 -0.33 2.47
Soybean meal -1.08 0.70 -0.14 0.39 -0.31 2.42 -0.72 0.68 -0.06 0.25 0.01 2.62
Orange juice -1.80 0.52 -0.15 0.44 -1.03 3.60 -1.02 0.42 -0.07 0.27 -0.40 2.85
Cotton -2.02 0.57 -0.18 0.49 -0.88 3.33 -1.06 0.60 -0.07 0.26 -0.44 3.67
Coffee -2.38 1.04 -0.29 0.60 -0.96 4.06 -2.22 0.68 -0.17 0.54 -1.17 4.52
Cocoa -2.13 0.88 -0.22 0.51 -0.71 3.57 -1.64 0.68 -0.18 0.47 -0.67 2.99
Feeder cattle -0.76 0.52 -0.05 0.22 0.20 3.42 -0.68 0.33 -0.02 0.16 -0.58 3.89
Lumber -1.38 0.49 -0.07 0.30 -0.69 3.88 -0.75 0.46 -0.04 0.22 -0.29 2.78
Silver -1.52 0.90 -0.33 0.61 -0.12 1.89 -1.59 0.98 -0.11 0.42 -0.49 3.20
Gold -1.08 0.71 -0.12 0.36 -0.30 2.63 -0.64 0.56 -0.04 0.22 0.08 2.73
Platinum -0.88 0.65 -0.16 0.39 0.19 1.94 -0.88 0.56 -0.05 0.23 -0.15 3.38
Crude oil -2.46 0.66 -0.24 0.55 -0.67 3.43 -0.91 0.53 -0.06 0.27 -0.44 2.89
Heating oil -2.47 0.73 -0.26 0.60 -0.69 3.24 -0.93 0.55 -0.07 0.28 -0.54 2.99
Natural gas -1.72 0.67 -0.27 0.56 -0.35 2.29 -1.13 0.69 -0.07 0.35 -0.24 2.78
33
Table 3: Switching Regression Results Based on Convenience Yield
This table displays the results of the switching regression in Equation (17). The coefficients are presented together with the standard errors
(in parentheses). Estimates significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, **, *** respectively. The column headed ‘LL’
shows the negative of the log-likelihood value.
Commodity βS,0 βS,1 βC,0 βC,1 βq,0 βq,1 σS σC LL
Oats -0.13 0.12 0.13 -2.09*** 0.81*** 0.33 0.89*** 1.72*** 813.57
(0.55) (0.13) (0.27) (0.80) (0.2) (0.36) (0.21) (0.44)
Wheat -0.19 -0.16 0.28** -0.42** 0.99*** 0.72*** 0.81*** 1.73*** 730.34
(0.13) (0.18) (0.13) (0.19) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.27)
Corn -0.15 0.03 -0.11 -0.19 0.68 0.56 0.64** 1.73*** 686.96
(0.29) (0.40) (0.83) (0.47) (0.49) (0.35) (0.32) (0.28)
Soybeans -0.11* -0.16 0.12 -0.11 0.71*** -0.59 0.53*** 1.56*** 697.16
(0.06) (0.17) (0.26) (0.47) (0.18) (0.92) (0.08) (0.20)
Soybean oil -0.17 -0.22 0.63 -0.07 0.63 0.34 0.74*** 1.87*** 792.73
(0.17) (0.30) (0.62) (0.52) (0.53) (1.46) (0.11) (0.49)
Soybean meal -0.11** -0.36*** 0.44* -0.67*** 0.84*** -0.10 0.75*** 2.03*** 798.20
(0.05) (0.09) (0.26) (0.25) (0.19) (0.31) (0.06) (0.22)
Orange juice -0.12 -0.04 1.03 0.32 1.26*** 0.12 0.90*** 2.36*** 804.49
(0.26) (0.29) (1.07) (1.62) (0.29) (0.69) (0.12) (0.48)
Cotton -0.13 -0.10 -0.03 0.09 0.54 -1.72 0.52 1.26*** 729.79
(0.23) (0.26) (0.10) (0.88) (2.11) (2.97) (0.40) (0.20)
Coffee -0.16 0.27 0.18** -0.35*** 0.02 0.25* 0.85*** 1.74*** 733.86
(0.14) (0.17) (0.07) (0.08) (0.19) (0.13) (0.06) (0.14)
Cocoa -0.14 -0.11 0.22 0.44 -0.36 4.04*** 1.00*** 1.52*** 824.79
(0.15) (0.12) (0.19) (0.58) (0.54) (0.81) (0.25) (0.33)
Feeder cattle 0.14 0.44* -0.10 -0.78** 0.37 -1.22** 0.36*** 0.87*** 430.93
(0.10) (0.27) (0.08) (0.32) (0.23) (0.51) (0.04) (0.07)
Lumber -0.26*** 0.13 2.79*** 138.63*** 1.10*** 34.38* 1.23*** 0.25** 807.62
(0.09) (0.18) (0.26) (10.10) (0.19) (20.14) (0.09) (0.10)
Silver -0.12 -0.10 -0.04 -0.68* 0.53*** 0.71* 0.71*** 2.27*** 776.56
(0.09) (0.14) (0.27) (0.35) (0.13) (0.37) (0.04) (0.31)
Gold -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.63 0.67* 1.17*** 0.48*** 1.21*** 413.79
(0.06) (0.15) (0.34) (0.63) (0.41) (0.21) (0.15) (0.11)
Platinum -0.02 -0.07 0.00 -2.08** 0.74** 1.27*** 0.70** 2.32*** 658.80
(0.20) (0.26) (0.23) (0.97) (0.36) (0.41) (0.29) (0.54)
Crude oil 0.18 -0.13 -1.48*** -0.99** 2.04*** -1.66 1.08* 2.04*** 569.17
(0.79) (0.26) (0.27) (0.46) (0.59) (2.86) (0.58) (0.74)
Heating oil 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.45 1.03*** -0.32 0.91*** 2.35*** 644.44
(0.33) (0.24) (0.20) (0.34) (0.23) (0.34) (0.19) (0.63)
Natural gas 1.94* -7.4*** -0.54*** -0.45* -93.08*** -46.58*** 266.14*** 2.26*** 580.42
(1.00) (1.00) (0.14) (0.26) (0.98) (0.99) (0.77) (0.09)
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Table 4: Likelihood Ratio Tests from Switching Regression Results Based on Convenience
Yield
This table displays the likelihood ratio test statistics of the switching regression in Equation (17) with p-
values in square brackets. The statistics significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, **,
*** respectively.
Commodity βS0 6= βC0 βC1 < 0 βS1 > βC1 βq1 < 0
Oats 0.77 5.04** 4.93** 0.50
[0.38] [0.02] [0.03] [0.48]
Wheat 1.96 0.22 0.08 1.50
[0.16] [0.64] [0.78] [0.22]
Corn 0.02 0.14 0.18 1.64
[0.87] [0.71] [0.67] [0.20]
Soybeans 2.25 0.15 0.03 2.39
[0.13] [0.70] [0.86] [0.12]
Soybean oil 12.15*** 0.01 0.05 0.55
[0.00] [0.91] [0.82] [0.46]
Soybean meal 4.34** 1.50 0.26 0.05
[0.04] [0.22] [0.61] [0.82]
Orange juice 6.77*** 0.10 0.12 0.04
[0.01] [0.75] [0.73] [0.85]
Cotton 0.41 0.43 0.45 14.66***
[0.52] [0.51] [0.50] [0.00]
Coffee 2.12 1.51 3.26* 0.67
[0.15] [0.22] [0.07] [0.41]
Cocoa 2.11 0.17 0.27 -11.12
[0.15] [0.68] [0.61] [1.00]
Feeder cattle 4.84** 6.93*** 6.90*** 2.32
[0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.13]
Lumber 8.51*** 12.89*** 12.89*** 22.22***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Silver 0.09 1.98 1.33 6.17**
[0.77] [0.16] [0.25] [0.01]
Gold 0.00 1.00 0.77 3.23*
[0.97] [0.32] [0.38] [0.07]
Platinum 0.00 4.41** 3.99** 5.18**
[0.95] [0.04] [0.05] [0.02]
Crude oil 4.60** 2.57 1.75 5.76**
[0.03] [0.11] [0.19] [0.02]
Heating oil 0.02 0.93 0.54 0.91
[0.89] [0.33] [0.46] [0.34]
Natural gas 0.00 3.29* 0.00 0.00
[1.00] [0.07] [1.00] [1.00]
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Table 5: Switching Regression Results Based on Macroeconomic Variables
This table displays the results of the switching regression in Equation (17). The coefficients are presented together with the standard errors
(in parentheses). Estimates significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, **, *** respectively. The column headed ‘LL’
shows the negative of the log-likelihood value.
Commodity βS,0 βS,1 βC,0 βC,1 βq,0 βq,1 σS σC LL
Oats -0.17 -0.15 1.74*** 1.69*** 1.52*** 0.56*** 1.00*** 1.95*** 816.94
(0.13) (0.18) (0.36) (0.54) (0.42) (0.21) (0.07) (0.32)
Wheat 0.96*** 2.60*** -0.29*** -0.44*** -1.04*** -0.55*** 1.03*** 0.83*** 728.57
(0.07) (0.35) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.03)
Corn -0.15* 0.06 -0.11 -0.32** 1.09*** -1.13*** 0.63*** 1.69*** 686.75
(0.08) (0.16) (0.24) (0.14) (0.21) (0.06) (0.03) (0.15)
Soybeans -0.10*** -0.15 0.16 -0.61 0.57 -0.16 0.54*** 1.58*** 698.80
(0.04) (0.23) (0.16) (1.05) (0.60) (0.29) (0.07) (0.33)
Soybean oil -0.13*** 0.00 0.52*** -0.65*** 0.75*** -0.34*** 0.71*** 1.84*** 793.41
(0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.10)
Soybean meal -0.12*** -0.55*** 0.44 -0.46 0.84** -0.96*** 0.71* 1.90 799.72
(0.04) (0.15) (0.59) (0.66) (0.37) (0.17) (0.37) (1.91)
Orange juice -0.10** 0.23 0.56 -0.67 1.38*** -1.36*** 0.84*** 2.16*** 802.26
(0.05) (0.33) (0.58) (0.49) (0.41) (0.38) (0.08) (0.40)
Cotton -0.14*** -0.08 -0.01 -0.19 0.91*** -1.89*** 0.68*** 1.44*** 734.11
(0.05) (0.12) (0.10) (0.35) (0.09) (0.55) (0.05) (0.12)
Coffee -0.19 0.18 0.24* -0.14 0.20 0.04 0.90*** 1.78*** 735.94
(0.19) (0.24) (0.13) (0.18) (0.29) (0.26) (0.11) (0.13)
Cocoa 0.22* -0.16 -0.43* -0.07 0.32 -0.40 1.32*** 0.68*** 819.09
(0.12) (0.23) (0.23) (0.15) (0.41) (0.45) (0.08) (0.10)
Feeder cattle 0.05* 0.24 -0.19 -0.82 2.08* -6.51** 0.49*** 1.24** 421.56
(0.03) (0.25) (0.36) (1.51) (1.24) (2.90) (0.08) (0.60)
Lumber 0.05 1.34*** -0.30*** -0.36 -1.01*** 0.52 0.41*** 1.38*** 810.82
(0.11) (0.44) (0.10) (0.39) (0.30) (0.99) (0.11) (0.16)
Silver -0.04 0.18* -0.10 -1.11*** 0.84*** 0.23 0.72*** 2.28*** 779.11
(0.07) (0.11) (0.39) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.05) (0.30)
Gold -0.06* -0.12 -0.04 -0.18 1.14*** -1.97*** 0.45*** 1.12*** 413.46
(0.04) (0.50) (0.16) (0.16) (0.26) (0.68) (0.04) (0.15)
Platinum -0.04 -0.46** 0.00 -0.29 1.37*** -1.67* 0.67*** 2.24*** 659.32
(0.04) (0.21) (0.35) (1.01) (0.21) (1.00) (0.05) (0.35)
Crude oil 0.13 -1.02** -0.92* -1.36*** 1.45*** -1.23*** 1.04*** 2.27*** 563.88
(0.09) (0.41) (0.50) (0.21) (0.54) (0.21) (0.06) (0.26)
Heating oil -0.01 -0.75 0.05 -1.54 0.94*** -0.12 0.90*** 2.38 637.35
(0.41) (1.26) (2.56) (8.03) (0.06) (5.58) (0.27) (4.07)
Natural gas -13.14*** -16.00*** -0.43** -0.17 -131.85*** -39.03*** 400.34*** 2.27*** 581.98
(1.00) (1.00) (0.17) (0.28) (0.98) (1.00) (0.80) (0.28)
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Table 6: Likelihood Ratio Tests from Switching Regression Results Based on Macroeconomic
Variables
This table displays the likelihood ratio test statistics of the switching regression in Equation (17) with p-
values in square brackets. The statistics significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, **,
*** respectively.
Commodity βS0 6= βC0 βC1 < 0 βS1 > βC1 βq1 < 0
Oats 4.47** 0.18 0.21 0.27
[0.03] [0.67] [0.65] [0.61]
Wheat 8.31*** 5.87** 6.90*** 0.15
[0.00] [0.02] [0.01] [0.70]
Corn 0.03 0.24 0.26 2.19
[0.85] [0.62] [0.61] [0.14]
Soybeans 2.85* 1.51 0.68 0.06
[0.09] [0.22] [0.41] [0.80]
Soybean oil 9.56*** 1.38 1.10 0.35
[0.00] [0.24] [0.29] [0.56]
Soybean meal 4.67** 0.47 0.01 1.84
[0.03] [0.49] [0.92] [0.17]
Orange juice 3.82* 0.59 0.85 3.84**
[0.05] [0.44] [0.36] [0.05]
Cotton 0.48 0.24 0.04 4.72**
[0.49] [0.62] [0.84] [0.03]
Coffee 2.78* 0.19 0.53 0.01
[0.10] [0.66] [0.47] [0.91]
Cocoa 10.45*** 0.22 0.07 0.90
[0.00] [0.64] [0.79] [0.34]
Feeder cattle 1.46 1.49 2.01 25.72***
[0.23] [0.22] [0.16] [0.00]
Lumber 2.22 1.08 3.35* 0.26
[0.14] [0.30] [0.07] [0.61]
Silver 0.05 2.80* 3.49* 0.37
[0.83] [0.09] [0.06] [0.54]
Gold 0.02 0.13 0.01 3.60*
[0.89] [0.72] [0.91] [0.06]
Platinum 0.01 0.09 0.03 2.97*
[0.9] [0.76] [0.87] [0.08]
Crude oil 3.23* 0.76 0.04 -5.21
[0.07] [0.38] [0.84] [1.00]
Heating oil 0.02 1.68 0.36 0.01
[0.88] [0.19] [0.55] [0.91]
Natural gas 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00
[1.00] [0.68] [1.00] [1.00]
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